agent-architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell commands to organize the workspace and validate generated output. Specific evidence includes file operations like
mkdir,echo, andtouchin Phase 4.1, and build/test commands likeeslint,tsc,npm test, andnpm run buildin Phase 5.4. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process for the skill involves fetching content from an external GitHub repository. Evidence: the
install_commandinmetadata.jsonusescurlto download the skill's primary instruction file. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of third-party software and libraries through package managers. Evidence includes references to
npm installin Phase 6.3 and the use of external validation tools in Phase 5.4. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it transforms untrusted user input into executable prompts for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: The user's project description acts as the primary data source.
- Boundary markers: The agent prompt template in Step 3.1 lacks delimiters or instructions to ignore nested commands, increasing the risk that a user-provided project description could hijack sub-agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The meta-agent and sub-agents possess significant capabilities, including filesystem access, background task execution, and shell command invocation (documented in Phase 4 and 5).
- Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the project requirements before they are interpolated into the sub-agent prompts.
Audit Metadata