cargo-lock-manager

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts scripts/check-lock.sh and scripts/update-lock.sh are vulnerable to command injection because they interpolate command-line arguments directly into shell commands without sanitization.
  • Evidence: In scripts/check-lock.sh (line 11), the variable $CARGO_TOML (sourced from the first argument) is used directly in a cargo check command. A maliciously crafted path could execute arbitrary shell commands.
  • Evidence: In scripts/update-lock.sh (line 7), the variable $CARGO_TOML is passed to the dirname command. This input is not validated, allowing for command injection via shell metacharacters or command substitution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external path inputs that influence shell command execution.
  • Ingestion points: The $1 argument in both scripts/check-lock.sh and scripts/update-lock.sh.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No validation or delimiters are used to constrain the input.
  • Capability inventory: The scripts possess the capability to execute system commands (cargo, cd, dirname) and modify the file system via cargo update.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The scripts do not escape shell metacharacters or verify that the input corresponds to a safe file path.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 03:30 PM