cargo-lock-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts
scripts/check-lock.shandscripts/update-lock.share vulnerable to command injection because they interpolate command-line arguments directly into shell commands without sanitization. - Evidence: In
scripts/check-lock.sh(line 11), the variable$CARGO_TOML(sourced from the first argument) is used directly in acargo checkcommand. A maliciously crafted path could execute arbitrary shell commands. - Evidence: In
scripts/update-lock.sh(line 7), the variable$CARGO_TOMLis passed to thedirnamecommand. This input is not validated, allowing for command injection via shell metacharacters or command substitution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external path inputs that influence shell command execution.
- Ingestion points: The
$1argument in bothscripts/check-lock.shandscripts/update-lock.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent. No validation or delimiters are used to constrain the input.
- Capability inventory: The scripts possess the capability to execute system commands (
cargo,cd,dirname) and modify the file system viacargo update. - Sanitization: Absent. The scripts do not escape shell metacharacters or verify that the input corresponds to a safe file path.
Audit Metadata