ats
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and displays task titles, descriptions, and messages from an external service (https://ats.difflab.ai). Malicious instructions could be placed in these fields by an external actor to influence the agent's behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is retrieved through
ats list,ats get,ats message list, and theats watchWebSocket stream.\n - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions found within the fetched data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can read and write configuration files in the user's home directory (~/.ats/config) and make network requests to the ATS backend.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the data received from the API before it is shown to the agent.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing the
@difflabai/ats-clipackage from the NPM registry. This is a vendor-owned package providing the CLI functionality.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing shell commands using theatsbinary. Examples in the documentation also show the agent using shell pipelines withjqand loops to automate task management.
Audit Metadata