cascade-orchestrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a 'Codex Sandbox Iteration' pattern designed to autonomously execute tests and modify the primary codebase based on those results.
- Evidence: The 'Execution Engine' section in SKILL.md outlines logic for
rerun_test(test)andapply_fix_to_main(fix)within a loop that attempts to fix code failures automatically up to 5 times. - Context: While described as a 'sandbox', the
apply_fix_to_mainstep bridges the gap between the isolated environment and the production source code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator is designed to process external inputs (e.g., from research stages or GitHub issues) and feed them into code generation models like 'Codex' in 'Full Auto' mode, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
stage_output,shared_memory, and GitHub-integrated inputs (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The workflow definitions lack explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local file system (
apply_fix_to_main), execute tests (rerun_test), and interact with GitHub APIs (github-pr). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety-filtering logic applied to data passed between stages or before it is used to generate code fixes.
Audit Metadata