cicd-intelligent-recovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection surface detected (Category 8). The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub Action logs and processes it using multiple AI agents to generate code fixes.
- Ingestion points: Failure logs are retrieved via
gh run view --logand parsed into.claude/.artifacts/parsed-failures.jsoninSKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates use simple text headers (e.g., "FAILURE DATA", "CODEBASE CONTEXT") but lack robust delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive permissions, including modifying files via
git apply, pushing code to remote branches withgit push, and creating Pull Requests usinggh pr create(Steps 4 and 8). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the log content before it is processed by the AI agents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx claude-flow@alphathroughout its SOP to execute remote code from the NPM registry. This represents a dependency on an unverified and unversioned package from an unknown source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands including
gh,git, andnodeto manage the CI/CD workflow, interact with the GitHub API, and apply automated code changes to the repository.
Audit Metadata