agent-evaluation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands and local scripts to aggregate session data for evaluation.
- Evidence: Documented use of
cat,jq, andnpx tsx eval.tsto process session JSON files and execution traces. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Execution traces and task data are transmitted to external LLM providers (OpenAI, Azure) for scoring purposes. This is a standard operation for this type of tool but involves external data sharing.
- Evidence:
curlcommands targetingapi.openai.comand Azure endpoint configurations inagent-eval.yaml. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted agent outputs and execution traces within an evaluation template, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
TASK,TRACE, andOUTPUTvariables extracted from.reflection/session_*.jsonand shell environment. - Boundary markers: None present in the evaluation prompt template to distinguish untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: Network access via
curland file access viacat. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the agent-generated trace content is implemented before it is sent to the LLM judge.
Audit Metadata