feature-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it instructs the agent to read and interact with content from external sources (GitHub issues, pull requests, and CI logs). Malicious actors could place instructions inside these external fields to influence the agent's implementation or review process.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads untrusted external data via
gh issue list,gh pr view, andgh run viewinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or provide warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed issue or PR data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive shell access to perform actions such as
git push,gh pr merge, andnpm testacross all steps inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the external content before it is processed or used in subsequent commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of various shell commands for version control and testing. While these are standard development practices, the agent's ability to run arbitrary project scripts via
npm testandnpm run test:e2erepresents a broad capability surface.
Audit Metadata