coding-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes the use of the
--yoloflag for the Codex CLI, which explicitly disables sandboxing and automatic approvals, allowing sub-agents to perform unreviewed modifications to the workspace. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: It documents an
elevated: trueparameter for the shell tool, which enables the agent to bypass standard sandbox restrictions and execute commands directly on the host machine. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing a third-party package (
@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent) from an unverified source to provide additional agent capabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external content (Pull Requests and cloned repositories), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through
git cloneandgh pr checkoutcommands used for code reviews and parallel fixes. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack directives for using boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when passing external data to sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The environment provides high-privilege capabilities, including the ability to spawn background shell processes and execute commands on the host.
- Sanitization: There are no requirements or instructions provided for sanitizing or validating external repository content before processing.
Audit Metadata