skills/espennilsen/pi/github/Gen Agent Trust Hub

github

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through GitHub PR review comments. It fetches these comments using scripts/fetch-threads.sh and instructs the agent to perform autonomous "auto-fixes" based on the content.
  • Ingestion points: External PR review comments fetched from the GitHub API and processed by the agent in the pr-fix and pr-fix-parallel workflows.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to treat the fetched comment data as untrusted or separate from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has extensive capabilities to modify the local filesystem, commit changes, push to remote repositories, and merge pull requests using tools described in SKILL.md and references/pr-merge.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill provides no mechanism to sanitize or validate the instructions contained within PR comments before the agent acts on them.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts (scripts/fetch-threads.sh, scripts/reply-thread.sh, scripts/resolve-thread.sh) that interact with the gh CLI and the filesystem. While these scripts are integral to the skill's functionality, they involve shell variable interpolation for parameters such as repository identifiers and PR numbers, which depends on the agent providing correctly formatted inputs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 1, 2026, 02:13 PM