github
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull request comments and descriptions, which are then used as directives for fixing code. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where a reviewer could embed malicious instructions to override agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch-threads.shretrieves PR review comment bodies;references/pr-create.mdandreferences/pr-fix.mdutilize PR summaries and commit logs. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" wrappers when processing external comment text, though
references/pr-fix-parallel.mddescribes an escalation protocol to a human orchestrator for ambiguous cases. - Capability inventory: The agent has extensive capabilities including full GitHub API access via the
ghCLI, filesystem write access viagit worktreeandgit commit, and the ability to execute arbitrary shell scripts provided in the skill. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or instruction-filtering of the retrieved GitHub comment bodies is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
ghCLI and local bash scripts to interact with GitHub and the local filesystem. - Evidence:
scripts/fetch-threads.sh,scripts/reply-thread.sh, andscripts/resolve-thread.shusegh api graphqlto perform mutations and queries. - Evidence:
references/pr-merge.mdandreferences/pr-fix.mddefine workflows involvinggit worktree,git branch -D, andgit pushcommands.
Audit Metadata