google-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external content via
gws gmail +triage,gws gmail users messages get,gws docs documents get, andgws sheets +readacross various recipes and personas. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between its system instructions and the untrusted data it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent significant capabilities, including sending emails (
gws gmail +send), posting to Chat spaces (gws chat +send), and modifying Drive permissions (gws drive permissions create). - Sanitization: Although the
gwsCLI supports content filtering via Model Armor (--sanitize), its use is optional and not enforced in the standard recipes or persona instructions, leaving the agent vulnerable to following instructions embedded in emails or documents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed around the execution of the
gwsCLI tool. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, it provides a functional surface area for an agent to execute shell commands with various flags and parameters based on potentially untrusted input.
Audit Metadata