rag-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a third-party Node.js package
@tobilu/qmdfrom a public registry. This introduces a supply chain dependency on a repository not associated with the skill's primary author. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions describe executing shell commands where user input is directly interpolated (e.g.,
qmd query "<query>"). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the agent does not properly escape the query string, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it retrieves and processes untrusted data from a knowledge base corpus.
- Ingestion points: Document excerpts retrieved via the
qmd querycommand output processed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved document content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool and interacts with the local file system via theqmdCLI tool. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation or sanitization steps for the data retrieved from the knowledge base before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata