markitdown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and converts external, untrusted document formats (PDF, DOCX, XLSX, HTML, etc.) into Markdown. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded within these documents could potentially influence the agent's behavior after the conversion process.\n
- Ingestion points: Files are ingested via the
MarkItDown.convert()method in multiple scripts, includingscripts/batch_convert.pyandscripts/convert_literature.py.\n - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and file system write permissions, which increases the potential impact of successful injection.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or specific instructions to the agent to ignore content found within the converted documents.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the text content extracted from the documents.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs subprocess execution to orchestrate internal scripts for schematic generation.\n
- Evidence:
scripts/generate_schematic.pyusessubprocess.runto callscripts/generate_schematic_ai.py. While the implementation uses a command list to prevent basic shell injection, it establishes a pattern of dynamic script execution within the skill environment.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs users and agents to install several external Python packages to enable its features.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdand format-specific guides recommend installingmarkitdown,requests,openai, andpython-dotenv. While these are well-known libraries, they are external dependencies required for the skill to function.
Audit Metadata