Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted PDF files, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where hidden instructions in the data could influence agent behavior. * Ingestion points: External PDF files are read by multiple scripts, including scripts/extract_form_structure.py and scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py. * Boundary markers: None; the instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore content found within the documents. * Capability inventory: The skill can write files, generate images, and execute shell commands via provided utilities. * Sanitization: The skill relies on standard library parsing and does not implement explicit sanitization of the extracted text content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py performs runtime modification (monkeypatching) of the pypdf library. Specifically, it overrides the DictionaryObject.get_inherited method to handle specific formatting requirements for choice field values.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the agent to execute various command-line tools for PDF manipulation, including pdftotext, qpdf, pdftk, and ImageMagick (magick) for cropping and image conversion tasks.
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