pptx-posters
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute local helper scripts. The commands are constructed using argument lists rather than shell strings, which effectively prevents command injection from user-supplied data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests user-provided text to generate prompts for an external image generation API without using robust boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: User-provided descriptions for poster figures enter the system via the
promptargument inscripts/generate_schematic.pyand are used inscripts/generate_schematic_ai.py(specifically ingenerate_iterativeandimprove_prompt). - Boundary markers: Absent; user input is concatenated directly with system instructions without delimiters like XML tags or explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and can execute local scripts, as well as system commands likegoogle-chromeandlibreofficefor document conversion. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the user-supplied prompt before it is sent to the LLM-based image generation service.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to
openrouter.ai(a well-known LLM and image model gateway) to perform its primary function. This is a legitimate use of an external service and follows standard API security practices, such as using environment variables for API keys.
Audit Metadata