pptx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file scripts/office/soffice.py implements a runtime compilation and process injection mechanism. It writes a hardcoded C source code block to a temporary file (lo_socket_shim.c), compiles it into a shared library (lo_socket_shim.so) using the system gcc compiler, and then forces the library to be loaded into the soffice process by setting the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This is documented as a shim to handle restricted AF_UNIX socket environments.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilize the subprocess module to execute external system binaries with varying levels of complexity: scripts/office/soffice.py executes gcc to build the socket shim; scripts/thumbnail.py executes soffice for PDF conversion and pdftoppm for image generation; scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executes git diff to compare document text versions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of PowerPoint and Word files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: The skill extracts and parses XML content from documents in files like scripts/office/unpack.py, scripts/add_slide.py, and the validation scripts. 2. Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the AI to ignore instructions embedded within the document XML during parsing. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system, execute arbitrary shell commands (via subprocess and gcc), and perform library injection. 4. Sanitization: While defusedxml is employed to mitigate standard XML vulnerabilities, the extracted text content is not sanitized to prevent instructions from influencing the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 02:35 PM