pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a runtime compilation and process injection mechanism. It writes a hardcoded C source code block to a temporary file (lo_socket_shim.c), compiles it into a shared library (lo_socket_shim.so) using the systemgcccompiler, and then forces the library to be loaded into thesofficeprocess by setting theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is documented as a shim to handle restricted AF_UNIX socket environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilize the
subprocessmodule to execute external system binaries with varying levels of complexity:scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccto build the socket shim;scripts/thumbnail.pyexecutessofficefor PDF conversion andpdftoppmfor image generation;scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto compare document text versions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of PowerPoint and Word files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: The skill extracts and parses XML content from documents in files like
scripts/office/unpack.py,scripts/add_slide.py, and the validation scripts. 2. Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the AI to ignore instructions embedded within the document XML during parsing. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system, execute arbitrary shell commands (via subprocess and gcc), and perform library injection. 4. Sanitization: Whiledefusedxmlis employed to mitigate standard XML vulnerabilities, the extracted text content is not sanitized to prevent instructions from influencing the agent's logic.
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