scientific-writing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local Python scripts (
scripts/generate_schematic.pyandscripts/generate_image.py) via the Bash tool to perform its primary functions. While these scripts are part of the skill's distribution, they represent an entry point for local command execution based on user-provided descriptions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate_schematic.pyusessubprocess.runto invokescripts/generate_schematic_ai.py. Although arguments are passed as a list to prevent shell injection, the runtime assembly of command-line calls for internal scripting is a dynamic execution pattern. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: A vulnerability surface exists in
scripts/generate_schematic_ai.pywhere user input (user_prompt) is directly interpolated into a larger prompt template sent to an external LLM. - Ingestion points: User-supplied figure descriptions passed as arguments to
generate_schematic.pyinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the prompt template in
ScientificSchematicGeneratorlacks delimiters to segregate instructions from user data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (saving images) and network access (OpenRouter API).
- Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the user prompt before it is included in the outgoing API request, allowing for potential manipulation of the image generation or review logic.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
check_env_filefunction in the generation scripts traverses parent directories searching for.envfiles to locate theOPENROUTER_API_KEY. In an agentic environment, this wide search scope could lead to the unintended exposure of sensitive configuration files located outside the skill's immediate workspace if the agent is operating in a nested directory structure.
Audit Metadata