xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation of C source code and uses process injection techniques.
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that it writes to~/.cache/xlsx-skill/lo-shim/lo_socket_shim.cand compiles usinggccinto a shared object.- The resulting library is then injected into the
soffice(LibreOffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. - While the stated purpose is to work around sandbox restrictions on Unix domain sockets, this technique involves low-level system call interception (
socket,listen,accept,close,read). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage its environment and dependencies.
scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccto compile the shim.scripts/recalc.pyandscripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesoffice(LibreOffice) to perform spreadsheet calculations.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto perform document comparisons.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a potential vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection via untrusted spreadsheet data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads content from
.xlsx,.xlsm,.csv, and.tsvfiles usingpandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbook(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None detected in instructions for handling untrusted workbook content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution (
Bashtool), file writing (Writetool), and the ability to compile and inject code. - Sanitization: While the
SKILL.mdsuggests installingdefusedxmlto harden against XML expansion attacks, it is not strictly enforced in the provided logic.
Audit Metadata