xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation of C source code and uses process injection techniques.
  • scripts/office/soffice.py contains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that it writes to ~/.cache/xlsx-skill/lo-shim/lo_socket_shim.c and compiles using gcc into a shared object.
  • The resulting library is then injected into the soffice (LibreOffice) process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable.
  • While the stated purpose is to work around sandbox restrictions on Unix domain sockets, this technique involves low-level system call interception (socket, listen, accept, close, read).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage its environment and dependencies.
  • scripts/office/soffice.py executes gcc to compile the shim.
  • scripts/recalc.py and scripts/office/soffice.py execute soffice (LibreOffice) to perform spreadsheet calculations.
  • scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executes git diff to perform document comparisons.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a potential vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection via untrusted spreadsheet data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads content from .xlsx, .xlsm, .csv, and .tsv files using pandas.read_excel and openpyxl.load_workbook (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None detected in instructions for handling untrusted workbook content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution (Bash tool), file writing (Write tool), and the ability to compile and inject code.
  • Sanitization: While the SKILL.md suggests installing defusedxml to harden against XML expansion attacks, it is not strictly enforced in the provided logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 02:35 PM