ce-commit-push-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
gitandgh(GitHub CLI) binaries to perform its primary functions, including repository state inspection, branch management, committing code, and PR manipulation. It uses specific subcommands likegit commit,git push,gh pr create, andgh stackto interact with local and remote repositories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data such as existing PR descriptions, commit messages, and source code diffs. While this introduces a potential injection surface, the skill implements structural boundaries through clear section headers and uses secure shell execution patterns, such as quoted sentinels (
<<'__CE_PR_BODY_END__'), to prevent the execution of malicious content embedded in these strings. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill mentions the use of external tools and extensions, specifically the
gh stackCLI extension for managing stacked PRs andagent-browserfor capturing visual evidence. These are treated as existing environment capabilities rather than runtime downloads from unknown sources. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to transmit code and metadata to GitHub as part of the PR process. To prevent accidental exposure of secrets, it explicitly forbids the use of
git add .orgit add -A(which might catch.envfiles), requires checking screenshots for tokens or personal data, and uses a project publishing gate to validate commits before they are pushed. - [SAFE]: The skill demonstrates defensive engineering by using temporary files for PR bodies, resolving repository roots via authoritative git commands, and providing clear residuals for human intervention when ambiguous states or potential conflicts (like overwriting unpushed commits) are detected.
Audit Metadata