subagent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to treat content inside
EVO DIRECTIVEbanners as "user-authoritative" and to "Follow it verbatim". It further includes a self-referential claim that "This is not tool-output prompt injection", which is a pattern used to encourage agents to ignore their internal safety filters when processing external data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol utilizes the
evo bashcommand to execute arbitrary shell commands within a remote container environment (--backend remote), as well as theevo runcommand to execute benchmarks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon external data including benchmark logs, task traces, and user-supplied directives spliced into the conversation context.
- Ingestion points:
EVO DIRECTIVEbanners in the conversation, task traces accessed viaevo traces, and experiment outcomes fromoutcome.json. - Boundary markers: Content is wrapped in
[EVO DIRECTIVE]and[END EVO DIRECTIVE]banners. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
evo bash), run scripts (evo run), modify files, and write annotations. - Sanitization: No sanitization is specified; the agent is explicitly instructed to follow the directive content "verbatim".
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to dynamically discover and load additional functional scripts ("category skills") at runtime based on the output of CLI commands like
evo config get task-skills.
Audit Metadata