skills/evo-hq/evo/subagent/Gen Agent Trust Hub

subagent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to treat content inside EVO DIRECTIVE banners as "user-authoritative" and to "Follow it verbatim". It further includes a self-referential claim that "This is not tool-output prompt injection", which is a pattern used to encourage agents to ignore their internal safety filters when processing external data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol utilizes the evo bash command to execute arbitrary shell commands within a remote container environment (--backend remote), as well as the evo run command to execute benchmarks.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon external data including benchmark logs, task traces, and user-supplied directives spliced into the conversation context.
  • Ingestion points: EVO DIRECTIVE banners in the conversation, task traces accessed via evo traces, and experiment outcomes from outcome.json.
  • Boundary markers: Content is wrapped in [EVO DIRECTIVE] and [END EVO DIRECTIVE] banners.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (evo bash), run scripts (evo run), modify files, and write annotations.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is specified; the agent is explicitly instructed to follow the directive content "verbatim".
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to dynamically discover and load additional functional scripts ("category skills") at runtime based on the output of CLI commands like evo config get task-skills.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 01:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — subagent