atlassian-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external Atlassian sources to drive automated workflows, creating a surface for injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: In
references/common-workflows.md, thetriageNewIssuefunction reads thesummaryanddescriptionfields from Jira issues. ThesyncMeetingNotesfunction reads thebody.storage.valuefrom Confluence pages. - Boundary markers: Absent. The code snippets analyze the ingested text using simple regular expressions and lowercase matching without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant write permissions, including
jira_update_issue,jira_add_comment,jira_create_issue,confluence_create_page, andconfluence_update_page(seen inreferences/common-workflows.md). - Sanitization: Absent. While
escapeHtmlis used for display purposes, no sanitization or validation is performed to prevent the AI agent from interpreting instructions contained within the Jira or Confluence data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing and running third-party MCP servers from external developers.
- The
SKILL.mdfile provides a configuration example that usesnpx -y @sooperset/mcp-atlassianto download and execute code. references/mcp-server-setup.mdsuggests several alternatives, includingmcp-atlassian(viauvxorpip) andatlassian-mcp(vianpm), which pull code from public registries at runtime.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of
npx -yanduvxin the recommended setup patterns constitutes dynamic download and execution of remote code. While this is common for MCP tool integration, it allows for the execution of arbitrary code from the package maintainers.
Audit Metadata