rag-architect

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a model loading pattern in references/chunking-strategies.md that enables the execution of remote repository code.
  • Evidence: The LateChunker class uses AutoModel.from_pretrained(model_name, trust_remote_code=True) to load embeddings from Jina AI's HuggingFace repository.
  • This configuration enables the execution of Python code included in the remote model repository during the loading process, which is a significant dynamic execution vector.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture for processing external data is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Document content is ingested via functions like RecursiveCharacterTextSplitter in SKILL.md and various retrieval functions in references/retrieval-optimization.md.
  • Boundary markers: The retrieval and generation examples lack explicit delimiters or instruction-isolation markers when incorporating retrieved content into LLM prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes multiple network-capable clients including openai, cohere, and voyageai, providing a path for data exfiltration if the agent is manipulated by instructions embedded in the documents it processes.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation logic in the code snippets provided to identify or block malicious instructions within ingested document text.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 09:45 AM