rag-architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a model loading pattern in
references/chunking-strategies.mdthat enables the execution of remote repository code. - Evidence: The
LateChunkerclass usesAutoModel.from_pretrained(model_name, trust_remote_code=True)to load embeddings from Jina AI's HuggingFace repository. - This configuration enables the execution of Python code included in the remote model repository during the loading process, which is a significant dynamic execution vector.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture for processing external data is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Document content is ingested via functions like
RecursiveCharacterTextSplitterinSKILL.mdand various retrieval functions inreferences/retrieval-optimization.md. - Boundary markers: The retrieval and generation examples lack explicit delimiters or instruction-isolation markers when incorporating retrieved content into LLM prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes multiple network-capable clients including
openai,cohere, andvoyageai, providing a path for data exfiltration if the agent is manipulated by instructions embedded in the documents it processes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation logic in the code snippets provided to identify or block malicious instructions within ingested document text.
Audit Metadata