sre-engineer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains multiple scripts that execute system-level commands using the
subprocessmodule. Examples includekubectlfor cluster management,systemctlfor service control, andiptables/tcfor network manipulation in chaos experiments. - Evidence in
SKILL.md:subprocess.run(["kubectl", "rollout", "restart", ...])at line 120. - Evidence in
references/automation-toil.md:subprocess.run(["systemctl", "restart", "myservice"], ...)at line 146 andsubprocess.run(["df", "-h", "/"], ...)at line 104. - Evidence in
references/incident-chaos.md:subprocess.run(["tc", "qdisc", "add", ...])at line 201 andsubprocess.run(["kubectl", "delete", pod, ...])at line 222. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
AutomatedRunbookclass inreferences/automation-toil.md(line 187) utilizessubprocess.run(step.command, shell=True), which executes strings directly in a shell environment. This is a high-risk pattern as it facilitates shell injection if the command string incorporates unvalidated external input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network requests to external endpoints. While currently targeting a local or internal Prometheus instance, the pattern could be repurposed for data exfiltration.
- Evidence in
SKILL.md: Use ofurllib.request.urlopen(url)to query Prometheus at line 112. - Evidence in
references/automation-toil.md: Use ofcurlviasubprocess.runto check service health at line 134. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests external data (metrics, incident reports) and possesses powerful command execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Metric data from Prometheus (
SKILL.md), manual runbook steps, and incident descriptions (references/incident-chaos.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: Full access to
kubectl,systemctl,iptables, and arbitrary shell execution viaAutomatedRunbook. - Sanitization: None detected. The Python scripts interpolate arguments directly into command strings or lists without validation or escaping (e.g.,
SKILL.mdline 121:f"deployment/{deployment}").
Audit Metadata