gcc
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and displays untrusted data from the project's git history.
- Ingestion points: Commit messages, intent descriptions, and code diffs are read from the git repository and
index.yamlviascripts/gcc_context.sh. - Boundary markers: Output is delimited using Markdown headers (e.g.,
## [$id]), but it lacks explicit instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in reconstructed commit messages. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, perform file system operations (
rm -rfduring cleanup), and communicate with external CLI tools. - Sanitization: While the skill correctly escapes data when writing to YAML or JSON, the content is presented in raw form to the agent during context reconstruction.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/gcc_bridge.shscript facilitates the transfer of git metadata (hashes, intents, and decision notes) to an external memory store via theaiyouclicommand-line tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on multiple shell scripts that execute system commands including
git,awk,sed, andrm -rf. Specifically,scripts/gcc_cleanup.shperforms directory removal based on paths defined in theindex.yamlfile. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references installation via
npx skills add, which involves fetching the skill code from a remote source, and the bridge script depends on the externalaiyouclipackage being present in the system's PATH.
Audit Metadata