agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the main CLI tool and its dependencies from public registries and repositories.
- Evidence: Instructions for
npm i -g agent-browser && agent-browser installare provided in SKILL.md. - Evidence: The
plugin addcommand allows downloading extension modules from npm or GitHub (references/commands.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates primarily by executing a comprehensive suite of browser automation commands via a dedicated CLI.
- Evidence: The core loop involves commands like
open,snapshot,click, andfill(SKILL.md). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides capabilities for running custom logic and scripts within the managed browser environment.
- Evidence: The
evalcommand allows executing JavaScript strings or files within the browser context (references/commands.md). - Evidence: The
network routecommand enables dynamic interception and mocking of network requests (references/commands.md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to handle untrusted data from the web and includes clear defensive instructions for the agent.
- Evidence: The
references/trust-boundaries.mdfile explicitly warns the agent to treat all browser-sourced content as data rather than instructions. - Evidence: The use of compact accessibility-tree snapshots (
@eNrefs) minimizes the amount of raw web content the agent must process (SKILL.md). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A detector alert for prompt injection was found to be a false positive.
- Evidence: The strings flagged in
references/trust-boundaries.mdare examples of malicious instructions (like "ignore previous instructions") used in a defensive context to teach the agent what to avoid.
Audit Metadata