build-train
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
bashtool to spawn child processes withclaude -pusing the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag enables the worker to execute shell commands and modify the filesystem without user review, creating a risk if the worker is compromised by the input data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
--adminflag withgh pr mergein Phase 3. This allows the agent to bypass repository branch protection rules and administrative constraints. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses authoritative directives such as 'CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS' and 'You are headless' to override the AI's standard operating procedures and safety guardrails.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data from GitHub issue titles and bodies is fetched via
gh issue viewin Phase 0.4 and interpolated into the worker prompt. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate the untrusted data from the system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
ghCLI for repo management and spawns child workers with full local access viaclaude -p. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub issues before it is used to build the execution prompt.
Audit Metadata