build-train

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the bash tool to spawn child processes with claude -p using the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag. This flag enables the worker to execute shell commands and modify the filesystem without user review, creating a risk if the worker is compromised by the input data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the --admin flag with gh pr merge in Phase 3. This allows the agent to bypass repository branch protection rules and administrative constraints.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses authoritative directives such as 'CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS' and 'You are headless' to override the AI's standard operating procedures and safety guardrails.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data from GitHub issue titles and bodies is fetched via gh issue view in Phase 0.4 and interpolated into the worker prompt.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate the untrusted data from the system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the gh CLI for repo management and spawns child workers with full local access via claude -p.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub issues before it is used to build the execution prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 22, 2026, 03:49 PM