cto-review

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill uses shell commands like grep and cut to extract sensitive authentication tokens (including GH_TOKEN, GH_PAT_FELLOWSHIP, PYLOT_DISPATCH_TOKEN, and QUEST_TOKEN) from a local .env file located at $HOME/projects/fellowship-dev/claude-buddy/.env.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on shell command execution to perform its logic, including complex piping and the use of the GitHub CLI (gh) for administrative repository operations such as labeling and merging Pull Requests. It also uses python3 -c for dynamic YAML parsing and JSON generation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from Pull Request titles, descriptions, and code diffs to drive its automated decision-making process (e.g., determining the review verdict).
  • Ingestion points: PR metadata and diffs are fetched in SKILL.md using gh pr view and gh pr diff.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted PR content from the agent's internal reasoning or to warn the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Across its scripts, the skill possesses the capability to merge PRs, edit labels, post comments, and send data to local APIs via curl.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or validation of the external PR data before interpreting it for the checklist and verdict decision.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 26, 2026, 02:53 AM