cto-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
gh(GitHub CLI) andpylot(vendor-specific CLI) to fetch PR details, diffs, comments, and team configurations. It also uses these tools to post comments, edit labels, and merge PRs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from pull request bodies and comments.
- Ingestion points: PR descriptions and comment threads are captured in the
handoff.mdfile during Stage 01. - Boundary markers: Handoff files use markdown headers like
## PR Descriptionand## All PR Commentsto delimit external data. - Capability inventory: The skill has merge authority and can post comments and modify labels on GitHub.
- Sanitization: External content is not sanitized before being provided to the review subagent in Stage 02.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves build records from an external staging server. The URL for this server is provided via the
PYLOT_STAGING_URLenvironment variable, and the request includes an authentication token from thePYLOT_STAGING_DISPATCH_TOKENenvironment variable.
Audit Metadata