oma-image
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its prompt amplification workflow.
- Ingestion points: In
resources/prompt-tips.md, the agent is instructed to fetch external creative briefs and prompt templates from theYouMind-OpenLabrepositories on GitHub using thegh apicommand. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or safety boundaries for the fetched external content, meaning the agent might interpret malicious instructions embedded in the prompt templates as authoritative.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing subprocesses for image generation (
oma,codex) and interacting with the GitHub API. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present for the data retrieved from the remote prompt libraries before it is incorporated into the agent's prompt context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on fetching content from external sources at runtime.
- Evidence:
resources/prompt-tips.mdcontains instructions for the agent to executegh apito download markdown files from theYouMind-OpenLab/awesome-nano-banana-pro-promptsandYouMind-OpenLab/awesome-gpt-image-2repositories. The data is then decoded from Base64 and processed locally. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates primarily by executing shell commands and local CLI tools.
- Evidence: The skill invokes
oma image generate,codex exec, andgh api. It also instructs the user to runoma updatefor maintenance, as seen inSKILL.mdandresources/execution-protocol.md.
Audit Metadata