find-session
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill appends user-defined shell functions to the
~/.zshrcfile, ensuring that the created aliases persist across different terminal sessions and system reboots. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands like
lsandgrepto interact with the local file system and search through Claude session logs located in~/.claude/projects/. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates untrusted user-provided content (search hints and alias names) directly into shell commands and file-writing operations without evident sanitization.
- Ingestion points: User-provided strings for unique-content hints (used in a
grepsearch) and short names (used as a shell function name) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to delimit or sanitize these inputs to prevent shell command breakout.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
ls,grep, and redirection (>>) to modify the~/.zshrcconfiguration file inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or escaping for the user-provided strings before they are used in sensitive shell operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata