latex-autofix
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The compilation command in Phase 2a (
cd <project-dir> && latexmk ... <filename>.tex) uses string interpolation to build a shell command. If the<project-dir>or<filename>arguments contain shell metacharacters like ";", "&&", or "|", it allows for arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Phase 1, the skill modifies the ".latexmkrc" configuration file to include a Perl "system()" call: "system("cp $out_dir/*.pdf . 2>/dev/null")". Since latexmk automatically executes the contents of ".latexmkrc" as Perl code, this creates a mechanism where shell commands are executed based on a configuration file that the agent is instructed to modify and trust.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an autonomous "Compile-Fix Loop" (Phase 2) that parses LaTeX log files ("out/.log") to automatically modify the source ".tex" files. An attacker could craft a malicious LaTeX document that, when compiled, generates specific log signatures designed to trick the agent into performing harmful edits or package injections (Indirect Prompt Injection).
- Ingestion points: "out/.log" (generated from untrusted source), ".tex" files, and ".bib" files.
- Boundary markers: None. The skill lacks delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the log data.
- Capability inventory: Access to tools including Bash, Write, Edit, and Grep.
- Sanitization: The skill performs no validation or escaping of the content extracted from log files before using it to apply auto-fixes.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata