literature
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs dynamic code execution by using
exec()to load Python utility functions directly from its markdown documentation files at runtime, specifically for parsing CLI outputs as described inreferences/scholarly-output-parsing.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from academic databases, web searches, and PDF files, which is then processed by sub-agents and used in synthesis without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Academic metadata (OpenAlex, Crossref), web search results (Exa, Google Scholar), and full-text content from arXiv and PDFs.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are used when interpolating external data into prompts in the
agent-templates.mdorsynthesis.mdfiles. - Capability inventory: Extensive capabilities including file system modification (
Write,Edit), network requests (curl,wget), and the ability to execute code viauv. - Sanitization: No verification or filtering is performed on external data before it influences the agent's reasoning or output.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to multiple external academic and AI services (OpenAlex, Crossref, arXiv, Semantic Scholar, OpenRouter) to retrieve research materials and perform grounding searches.
Audit Metadata