session-log
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to monitor and read from the
~/.claude/directory to log changes to global infrastructure, such as skills, hooks, and settings. This directory is sensitive as it contains the agent's internal state and configuration. Accessing these paths creates a risk of exposing the agent's internal environment details. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and summarizes external, potentially untrusted content.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads existing context from
.context/current-focus.mdand historical logs inlog/*.md(SKILL.md, Step 2). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the skill.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write,Edit,mkdir, andls(SKILL.md, frontmatter). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is specified before the agent processes and summarizes it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bash(mkdir*)andBash(ls*)tools to manage the directory structure for logs. While restricted to specific commands, this allows the agent to modify and traverse the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata