autonomous-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively utilizes the Bash tool and mcp__ide__executeCode to perform full-stack development tasks, such as running compilers, package managers (npm, pip, cargo), and test runners. It also generates and executes platform-specific supervisor scripts (auto-continue.sh, auto-continue.ps1) to maintain autonomous operation loops across multiple sessions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to automatically discover and install Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers from well-known registries. It references official packages for browser automation, filesystem management, and database operations (e.g., from the Anthropic-AI GitHub organization), which are used to extend the agent's capabilities in a development environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from project specifications, external documentation via WebFetch, and web search results.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads requirements from workspace files and external sources using the Read, WebFetch, and WebSearch tools.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific prompt-level delimiters or 'ignore' warnings for the data being processed, relying on general safety guidelines defined in separate reference files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has high-privilege tools including Bash, Write, Edit, and mcp__ide__executeCode, which could be exploited if malicious instructions are successfully injected via project data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external sources before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 11, 2026, 02:48 PM