tw-edu-school-document
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute a Python script (scripts/generate_school_doc.py) with arguments derived from user input (--subject,--content,--author,--school). This pattern creates a potential for command injection if the agent or the platform does not properly escape shell characters in the user-supplied strings before passing them to the shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted user data and writes it directly into a generated
.docxfile without sanitization or boundary markers. This could be exploited if the output file is later processed by another AI agent. - Ingestion points: User input collected in Step 1 and used in the Step 2 bash command.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or the generation script.
- Capability inventory:
Bashfor command execution,Writefor file creation, andpython-docxfor document manipulation. - Sanitization: No input sanitization or escaping logic is present in the
generate_school_doc.pyscript for the text data. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill instructions specify reading files from parent directories (e.g.,
../../tw_edu_concept_alignment.mdand../../tw_edu_mcp_strategy.md). While these appear to be shared configuration or policy files for a specific ecosystem of skills, this pattern highlights the skill's ability to access the file system beyond its immediate directory.
Audit Metadata