kata-add-phase
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands in the
parse_argumentsstep using the$ARGUMENTSvariable without prior validation. Specifically, the patternecho "$ARGUMENTS" | sed 's/^--issue //'can be exploited to execute arbitrary shell commands if the input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons or command substitutions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In the
generate_slugstep, thedescriptionvariable—which may be sourced from an untrusted issue file title—is processed usingecho "$description". This allows for potential command execution within the agent's shell environment if the description contains malicious shell patterns. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection when using the
--issueflag. Ingestion point: Thedescriptionis extracted from thetitlefield of a user-provided issue file. Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat this content as data rather than instructions when it is interpolated into thevalidate_slicingprompt. Capability inventory: The skill allows for filesystem modifications, including directory creation and appending content toROADMAP.mdandSTATE.md. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted issue content is performed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script
scripts/kata-lib.cjsand invokes another skillkata-doctor, which introduces dependencies on external local code execution.
Audit Metadata