kata-customize
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Template names extracted from
$ARGUMENTSare used directly in shell commands withinSKILL.md(e.g.,node scripts/kata-lib.cjs resolve-template "$TEMPLATE_NAME"). This pattern allows for potential command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like backticks or subshell expansions, even when double-quoted.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill discovery scriptscripts/list-templates.shreads all markdown files from siblingkata-*skill directories to extract template metadata. Since this external data is displayed to the agent without sanitization or boundary markers, a malicious sibling skill could inject instructions into the template descriptions to influence the agent's behavior.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/list-templates.sh(reads../../kata-*/references/*.md)\n - Boundary markers: Absent; extracted metadata is displayed directly in a markdown table.\n
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
bash,node), file system modifications (mkdir,cp), and use of theEdittool.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the script performs basic YAML extraction without content validation.
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