converting-commands-to-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and transforms instructions from untrusted source files (slash commands) and writes them into new skill files.
- Ingestion points: Source command files located in
./commands/and~/.claude/commands/are ingested at runtime. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts in the source data during transformation.
- Capability inventory: The skill relies on
WriteandBashtools to manage migration and executes a Python script via an automated hook. - Sanitization: Absent. The provided transformation rules focus on naming and YAML metadata structure rather than the sanitization of instructional content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a
PostToolUsehook that automatically executes a local Python validation script (scripts/validate-frontmatter.py) whenever theWritetool is used. This automated execution is a platform feature used here for metadata enforcement. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational instructions direct the agent to use standard shell commands such as
ls,cat, andfindto perform file system discovery and migration tasks.
Audit Metadata