skills/garethmanning/claude-education-skills/reading-comprehension-strategy-selector/Gen Agent Trust Hub
reading-comprehension-strategy-selector
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in input data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
{{text_description}},{{reader_challenge}},{{student_profiles}}, and{{text_extract}}variables in theSKILL.mdprompt template. - Boundary markers: The prompt lacks robust delimiters (such as XML tags or unique string markers) to separate the instruction set from the user-provided text content, relying only on simple bold labels.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
disable-model-invocation: falseand does not restrict tool access in the frontmatter, meaning successful injection could potentially leverage any tools available in the agent's environment. - Sanitization: The instructions do not include validation steps or directives to the model to ignore instructions found within the processed text extracts.
Audit Metadata