document-release

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Pull Request (PR) or Merge Request (MR) bodies, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: PR/MR bodies are fetched using platform-specific commands (gh pr view, glab mr view) in Step 9.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses a "trust envelope" and the gstack-issue-guard tool to wrap external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system tools (Read, Write, Edit, Glob), shell execution (Bash), and source control tools (git, gh, glab).
  • Sanitization: Content is passed through gstack-redact for privacy and a "banner tripwire" mechanism in Step 9 to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the external content.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill may prompt the installation of the @openai/codex package from the official npm registry if it is not present. This is a well-known tool from a recognized service provider.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various Git and platform CLI commands to manage documentation and PR state, consistent with its primary function.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses gstack-skill-start to receive and execute one-time instruction blocks for onboarding and consent, guarded by matching session IDs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 16, 2026, 08:17 PM