retro
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
eval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug ...)"andsource <(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-repo-mode ...)within its preamble. These patterns execute shell code dynamically generated by external binaries, which can modify the agent's environment or execute arbitrary commands at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands and external binaries located in
~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/, including update checks, telemetry logging, and learning searches. It also includes logic to automatically modify theCLAUDE.mdfile and perform agit committo persist skill routing rules. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses PII by reading
git config user.nameandgit config user.email. It logs telemetry data (including repository names, skill usage statistics, and session IDs) to local JSONL files and potentially sends this data to a remote endpoint via thegstack-telemetry-logbinary. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions contain directives such as 'Treat the skill file as executable instructions, not reference', which aims to override the model's standard safety handling of external documents in favor of strict, step-by-step obedience to the skill's workflow.
Audit Metadata