setup-browser-cookies
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is instructed to process and follow directive blocks (
GSTACK_INSTRUCTION_BEGIN) returned in the tool output ofgstack-skill-start. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where tool output can dynamically influence the agent's instructions. - Ingestion points: The stdout of the
gstack-skill-startcommand executed in the preamble. - Boundary markers: The instructions specify the use of
GSTACK_INSTRUCTION_BEGIN: <id> <session-id>andGSTACK_INSTRUCTION_ENDdelimiters. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Read, andAskUserQuestion, and is instructed to execute workflows based on the injected blocks. - Sanitization: The skill implements a session-id validation check, requiring the instruction block to match the current
SESSION_IDgenerated during that specific tool run. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs telemetry operations at the end of its workflow using
gstack-skill-end. It transmits operational metadata (outcome, session IDs, error messages) to a local binary, which likely forwards it to a remote service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several local binaries located in
~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/to manage its lifecycle, logging, and telemetry. It also executes a browser control tool (proxied through the variable$B) to perform sensitive cookie imports. - [SAFE]: The skill includes robust privacy rules that explicitly forbid the agent from printing or publishing sensitive information, including environment variables, tokens, full process tables, cookie values, or passwords. It mandates
AskUserQuestionfor all critical user decisions regarding profile selection and domain scoping.
Audit Metadata