vi
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to run the commandpython -m ane_package.qa.word_countto perform word count verification. The file path passed to this command is constructed using a run slug and specialist name derived from the inbound plan and registry. This interpolation could potentially be a vector for command injection if the input strings contain shell metacharacters. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a hardcoded absolute file path on a specific user's OneDrive directory (
C:/Users/AGasser/OneDrive/5 ANE CLAUDE work folder/mel_wiki/wiki/). While intended for loading project context, this pattern exposes local directory structures and is non-portable. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator dynamically spawns subagents using the
Agenttool based on a registry (agent_registry.md). It also supports a 'Write-and-bridge' pattern that allows the creation and execution of inline prompts for a 'general-purpose' subagent when a specific specialist is not found in the registry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As an orchestration layer, the skill ingests content from external plans and subagent returns, which could potentially contain malicious instructions. The skill implements several mitigation strategies, including:
- Ingestion points: Inbound prompt blocks (
## P1 wiki context), subagent returns files in%TEMP%, and local wiki files. - Boundary markers: The use of specific markdown blocks and slugs to identify and isolate run-specific data.
- Capability inventory: Access to
Agent(subagent spawning),Read,Write,Edit(file system modification), andBash(shell execution). - Sanitization: A comprehensive review process involving dedicated
qa-reviewerandsafeguarding-reviewersubagents, as well as automated sweeps for em-dashes and factual reliability.
Audit Metadata