gate-exchange-candydrop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
setup.shscript included in the skill contains logic to usesudo installto place thegate-clibinary in/usr/local/binif it cannot be installed in the user's local directory. While this is a common pattern for CLI tool installation, it involves acquiring elevated permissions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
gate-clibinary and its associated checksum files from the official Gate repository on GitHub (github.com/gate/gate-cli). This occurs during the skill's setup process via thesetup.shscript and is also defined in the skill's metadata for platform-specific installation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing
gate-clicommands for both read-only queries (activities, rules, progress) and state-changing actions (registration). The skill correctly implements a mandatory "Preview-Confirm" workflow for theregistercommand to ensure user intent before execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from the Gate API, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection through activity details and task descriptions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads output from
gate-cliwhich contains data from external exchange servers (referenced inSKILL.mdandreferences/activities.md). - Boundary markers: The skill includes explicit instructions for the agent to present a preview and wait for user confirmation ("confirm"/"cancel") before performing write operations.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, perform network requests (via the CLI), and write to the file system during installation.
- Sanitization: The skill employs structured response templates and a specific mapping table for task types (
rule_name) to normalize API data before it is presented to the user.
Audit Metadata