sdd-propose

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from exploration reports and user descriptions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the mem_get_observation tool (retrieving exploration results) and direct user descriptions provided at runtime.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters (like XML tags) to separate untrusted data from the system prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including filesystem writes (openspec/changes/) and data persistence through the mem_save tool.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or sanitization of the external content before it is interpolated into the proposal template.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs directory and file operations on the local system as part of its core functionality.
  • Evidence: Step 2 and Step 4 instruct the agent to create directory structures and write proposal.md files to the openspec/ path.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic loading of additional instruction sets from computed paths.
  • Evidence: Step 1 instructs the agent to load additional skills from a path provided in the launch prompt. This dynamic loading of instructions from paths determined at runtime is a potential vector for executing unintended logic if the path is manipulated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 28, 2026, 02:23 PM