skills/getsentry/sentry/lint-fix/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lint-fix

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided arguments $0 (rule name) and $1 (glob pattern) directly into shell commands. For example, pnpm exec eslint --rule '@sentry/scraps/$0: error' "$1" is used to count and fix violations. This presents a risk of command injection if the input is not sanitized, as shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |, or backticks) could be used to execute arbitrary commands.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: For large-scale rollouts exceeding 500 violations, the skill suggests that the agent write and execute temporary codemods or scripts using jscodeshift or @typescript-eslint/typescript-estree. This involves the runtime generation and execution of code logic, which can be an attack vector if the script generation is influenced by malicious input.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves reading and modifying source code files. This creates an ingestion surface where a malicious file in the codebase could contain instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the linting and fixing process.
  • Ingestion points: Source files matching the glob pattern provided in the $1 argument are read by the agent (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings are used when processing the content of these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (eslint, prek) and perform filesystem writes (applying lint fixes) across the codebase.
  • Sanitization: The skill instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation of the file content before the agent attempts to process and fix violations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 07:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lint-fix