skills/getvhs/vhscli-skills/vhscli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

vhscli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute npx @getvhs/vhscli@latest, which downloads the latest version of the tool from the npm registry at runtime. This package is managed by the skill's author (getvhs).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by invoking the vhscli tool through shell commands, passing user prompts and file paths as arguments.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool is designed to upload local media files (images, videos, and PDFs) to a remote server for processing by AI models. This behavior is the primary intended function of the skill and is clearly documented.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The tool manages user authentication by storing session tokens in a local file at ~/.vhs/session.json following a login command. This is standard session persistence for a command-line utility.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted external data (images, PDFs, and videos), which constitutes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The agent passes paths for user-provided images (-i), PDFs (-f), and videos (-v) to the chat and generate commands.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific boundary markers for the file content, although the prompt guides recommend requesting structured JSON output to improve reliability.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution, file system access, and network communication.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content filtering for the processed media is mentioned in the instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 12:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — vhscli