vhscli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute
npx @getvhs/vhscli@latest, which downloads the latest version of the tool from the npm registry at runtime. This package is managed by the skill's author (getvhs). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by invoking the
vhsclitool through shell commands, passing user prompts and file paths as arguments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool is designed to upload local media files (images, videos, and PDFs) to a remote server for processing by AI models. This behavior is the primary intended function of the skill and is clearly documented.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The tool manages user authentication by storing session tokens in a local file at
~/.vhs/session.jsonfollowing alogincommand. This is standard session persistence for a command-line utility. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted external data (images, PDFs, and videos), which constitutes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent passes paths for user-provided images (
-i), PDFs (-f), and videos (-v) to thechatandgeneratecommands. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific boundary markers for the file content, although the prompt guides recommend requesting structured JSON output to improve reliability.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution, file system access, and network communication.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content filtering for the processed media is mentioned in the instructions.
Audit Metadata