tabz-integration

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tabz-last shell function in references/cli-websocket.md captures the most recent command from the user's history and re-executes it ($($cmd)) to capture output. This can lead to unintended side effects if the command is not idempotent.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's integration workflow depends on reading a sensitive authentication token from a temporary file location (/tmp/tabz-auth-token), which may be accessible to other users on the same system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Automated functions such as tabz-explain and tabz-last capture current terminal session output or tmux pane content and transmit it to a local service, potentially exposing sensitive information from the terminal buffer.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Documentation examples in references/spawn-api.md explicitly instruct the use of flags like --dangerously-skip-permissions, which are designed to bypass the safety and permission filters of the target agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for users to persist utility functions by modifying shell configuration files such as .bashrc or .zshrc.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 02:15 AM