terminals
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands on the host system through a local REST API (
http://localhost:8129/api/spawn) using thecommandparameter as documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/spawn-api.md.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Instructions inSKILL.mdandreferences/spawn-api.mdrecommend retrieving an authentication token from/tmp/tabz-auth-token. On many operating systems, the/tmpdirectory is world-readable, which can lead to the exposure of the authentication token to other users or processes on the same machine.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Thereferences/worker-prompts.mdfile includes a 'Soften Aggressive Language' section that provides techniques to modify instructions (e.g., replacing 'CRITICAL' or 'MUST' with softer phrasing) specifically to avoid triggering model-internal guardrails or instruction filters.- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The orchestrator pattern described inreferences/worker-prompts.mddefines an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data from issue descriptions or file contents could influence the behavior of spawned subagents ('workers') that have shell access. - Ingestion points: Worker prompts generated in
references/worker-prompts.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; templates do not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: Shell access in spawned terminals, session management via
tmux, and local API control (documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/spawn-api.md). - Sanitization: Absent; prompt content is interpolated directly into terminal command strings or
tmuxinputs.
Audit Metadata