skills/ggprompts/tabzchrome/terminals/Gen Agent Trust Hub

terminals

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands on the host system through a local REST API (http://localhost:8129/api/spawn) using the command parameter as documented in SKILL.md and references/spawn-api.md.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/spawn-api.md recommend retrieving an authentication token from /tmp/tabz-auth-token. On many operating systems, the /tmp directory is world-readable, which can lead to the exposure of the authentication token to other users or processes on the same machine.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The references/worker-prompts.md file includes a 'Soften Aggressive Language' section that provides techniques to modify instructions (e.g., replacing 'CRITICAL' or 'MUST' with softer phrasing) specifically to avoid triggering model-internal guardrails or instruction filters.- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The orchestrator pattern described in references/worker-prompts.md defines an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data from issue descriptions or file contents could influence the behavior of spawned subagents ('workers') that have shell access.
  • Ingestion points: Worker prompts generated in references/worker-prompts.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; templates do not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Shell access in spawned terminals, session management via tmux, and local API control (documented in SKILL.md and references/spawn-api.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; prompt content is interpolated directly into terminal command strings or tmux inputs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 02:15 AM