security-audit

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's instructions define a workflow that reads and analyzes arbitrary codebase files (ingestion points in SKILL.md Phases 1 and 5). This processing of untrusted data creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in a target codebase could attempt to influence the agent's audit report or behavior.\n
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read every line of in-scope code in a repository (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimitation or safety markers to prevent instructions within the audited code from being interpreted as agent commands.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read project files and write a report file at the project root (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit sanitization or filtering steps mentioned for the untrusted code being audited.\n- [SAFE]: Automated scanner alerts identified phishing-style URLs (e.g., userinfo confusion examples) and unsafe code injection patterns (e.g., eval in references/language-footguns/python.md). Technical analysis confirms these are non-malicious educational placeholders and descriptive warnings within the skill's security checklists and language-specific reference guides intended to assist the agent in detecting vulnerabilities during a codebase audit.
Recommendations
  • Contains 3 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 08:13 AM