rag-eval
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill uses a script
scripts/session_ingest.pyto search for and read sensitive user information from the home directory. Specifically, it targets~/.claude/projects/and~/.skill-studio/sessions/to extract chat transcripts and session history. While this is part of the tool's core functionality for ingesting prior sessions, it exposes private conversation data to the agent's context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local Python scripts (
scripts/session_ingest.pyandscripts/eval_sweep.py) to perform its primary tasks. These scripts are invoked via the shell, which is a standard pattern for this type of tool but represents a local execution surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external "gold-set" Q&A pairs, large user datasets/corpora, and session transcripts parsed by the ingest script.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters mentioned to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed datasets or transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
eval_sweep.py), write files to the local repository (.rag-eval/), and perform network searches via external tools (tavily-search,firecrawl-research). - Sanitization: The provided
session_ingest.pyscript uses regex for signal extraction but does not perform sanitization of the text content before it is passed to the agent.
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