skills/glebis/claude-skills/rag-eval/Gen Agent Trust Hub

rag-eval

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scripts/session_ingest.py script accesses sensitive local directories including ~/.claude/projects/ and ~/.skill-studio/sessions/. These directories contain transcripts and session history from other AI tools, which may expose sensitive information from unrelated projects or conversations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute local Python scripts (scripts/session_ingest.py and scripts/eval_sweep.py). The inclusion of user-provided variables like <session_id> in shell commands creates a risk of command injection if the input is not strictly sanitized by the execution environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from the user's dataset, gold-set, and session transcripts.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the dataset corpus, the Q&A gold-set, and session transcripts processed by scripts/session_ingest.py.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes local Python scripts (subprocess equivalent) and has network capabilities via tavily-search and firecrawl-research.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external content before it is used to plan or run evaluation sweeps.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 9, 2026, 06:07 PM