session-anonymizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The encryption feature in
scripts/anonymize.pypasses the user-provided password as a cleartext command-line argument (-pass pass:password) to theopensslutility. This practice exposes the password to any other user on a shared system who can view the process list (e.g., usingpsortop). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
opflibrary directly from a remote GitHub repository (github.com/openai/privacy-filter.git) as specified in the prerequisites section ofSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically executes external binary tools including the
opfprivacy filter and theopensslencryption utility via thesubprocess.runfunction. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. In
scripts/anonymize.py, therun_ollamafunction constructs an LLM prompt by directly concatenating raw, untrusted transcript text to a hardcoded instruction string. This allows content within the transcript to potentially override the agent's instructions. - Ingestion points:
scripts/anonymize.pyreads data from input files or standard input via themain()function. - Boundary markers: None. The transcript text is appended directly to the end of the prompt string.
- Capability inventory: The script can execute subprocesses (
opf,openssl), write files to the local system, and perform local network requests (urllib.request). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the input text before it is interpolated into the prompt.
Audit Metadata